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Abstract
In this paper, we present a general statistical framework within
which we can draw a new interpretation of the Laakso-Taagepera ef-
fective number of parties fragmentation index. With the particular
method of sampling with probability proportional to the party sizes,
we show that the Laakso-Taagepera effective number of parties is the
inverse of the size biased version of the traditional expected party size
in shares. Further, we provide an axiomatic definition of the Laakso-
Taagepera effective number of parties.
Keywords: Fragmentation, effective number of parties, concentration
index, size biased sampling, length biased sampling
Re´sume´
Nous pre´sentons dans cet article un environnement statistique ge´ne´ral dans
lequel nous pouvons donner une interpre´tation nouvelle du nombre effectif
de partis de Laakso-Taagepera comme indice de fragmentation. Graˆce a` la
me´thode particulie`re d’e´chantillonnage dans laquelle les probabilite´s sont
proportionnelles aux tailles des partis, nous montrons que le nombre effectif
de partis de Laakso-Taagepera n’est rien d’autre que la version biaise´e par la
taille de l’espe´rance normale de la taille des partis. De plus, nous fournissons
une de´finition axiomatique du nombre effectif de partis de Laakso-Taagepera.
JEL classification: C65, D71, D72
Mot-cle´s : Fragmentation, nombre effectif de partis, indice de concentration,
e´chantillonage biaise´e par la taille
∗This working paper is a preliminary version of a joint article with Patrick Dumont
(Universite´ du Luxembourg).
†The author thanks Jean-Luc Marichal for the help on the axiomatic part of the paper.
We also thank Agnieszka Rusinowska and the participants to the journe´es doctorales de
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Introduction
What do we mean by the fragmentation of a party-system ? What is the
definition of such a widely used concept in the political science field ? Why
is it important to assess the degree of fragmentation of party-systems ?
More importantly why the concept receives hearty agreement for its use
when there is no unanimous consensus in its meaning ? Our aim is to
discover or understand the definition that has to be given to the notion
of fragmentation on the basis of its most accepted operationalization : the
Effective Number of Parties (ENP). Our task is motivated by the work of
Feld and Grofman [2007] that present an alternative way to compute the
Effective Number of Parties in terms of well-known statistics (mean and
variance). Their work used as a springboard for ours, we seek to dive more
deeper in the mathematical properties of the ENP in order to understand
exactly its exact meaning and interpretation.
An important aspect of classification of party-systems is the degree of
competition among political parties which in turn, depends ceteris paribus
on the number and sizes of the elected parties. A system is said to be
fragmented if it is composed of many elected parties. Hence, at a first
approximation we can think that a key feature for a definition of the no-
tion of fragmentation refers to the number of elected parties (see Elkins
[1974],p.683). Of course the number of parties alone does not tell anything
on the size distribution of seats and is of poor information. Some authors
have proposed to enrich the concept of fragmentation in order to go beyond
the only consideration of the number of parties and the distribution of seats,
such as in Blau [2008] or Ricciuti [2004]. Despite these efforts, the quantita-
tive very aspect of fragmentation remains deeply rooted in the field. Since
the first proposal for classification in term of two-party and multi-party pro-
posed by Duverger (Duverger [1959]), scholars have constantly tried to give
more precise quantifications of the number of competing parties and distri-
bution of sizes. One such measure has reached a high degree of consensus
among scholars : the Laakso-Taagepera Effective Number of Parties (ENP)
(see Lijphart [1994] p.68 and Laakso and Taagepera [1979]). Despite the
drawbacks and flaws of the ENP, stressed by some authors suggesting new
measures (see Dumont and Caulier [2003], Dunleavy and Boucek [2003],
Golosov [2010], Kline [2009], Molinar [1991]), the ENP remains the most
constant used, if not the only one, measure of party-system fragmentation.
It thus seems that if we are in state to correctly and consistently give a
correct interpretation to the ENP, we will directly get a definition for the
concept of fragmentation, given that the ENP is “The” measure of fragmen-
tation.
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The ENP in a mean and variance framework
We introduce some notation in order to present the classical formula for the
ENP and the proposed reformulation of Feld and Grofman [2007] in terms
of mean and variance.
Let N denote a party-system composed of n political parties, n a finite
integer. Each party i owns xi ∈ R+ seats in the party-system, with R+
the set of nonnegative real numbers and x¯ =
∑n
i=1 xi is the total number
of seats in the system. We assume that x¯ is known and fixed for a given
party-system. We denote by si = xi/x¯ the shares of seats of party i, for each
i in N . A party-system N consists either in a distribution of seats x ∈ Rn+ or
shares s ∈ [0, 1]n with Rn+ and [0, 1]n the n-fold cartesian product of R+ and
[0, 1] respectively. The Effective Number of Parties (Laakso and Taagepera
[1979]) of a party-system N is a function ENP : Rn+ → R+ defined by
ENP(x) =
1∑n
i=1 (xi/x¯)
2 =
(
n∑
i=1
s2i
)−1
the inverse of the sum of squared shares.
Some basic statistics : For a distribution of seats x, let
µ(x) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi (1)
the mean number of seats among parties,
σ2(x) = 1/n
n∑
i=1
(xi − µ(x)) (2)
the variance of x. Correspondingly we have µ(s) and σ2(s) the mean and
variance of s. Note that µ(s) = 1/n. Alternatively we can calculate the
variance by
σ2(s) = µ(s2)− µ2(s) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
s2i −
1
n2
,
that can be rewritten
n∑
i=1
s2i = n
(
σ2(s) +
1
n2
)
= nσ2(s) + µ(s)
establishing the identity
ENP(x) = n/(1 + n2σ2(s)) = 1/(µ(s) + nσ2(s)) (3)
as in Feld and Grofman [2007] (equation (10), p.105).1
1The same derivation can be obtained from the relation ENP−1 = 1
n
+ nσ2(s) in
Golosov [2010] (equation (1) p.2).
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If relation 3 is interesting as it allows the calculation of ENP using two
well-known statistics, the mean and the variance, or even simpler only by
knowing n and the variance (since the mean of n shares is always 1/n), it
could then mislead to the conclusion that the ENP is merely a reformu-
lation of the variance of a distribution of seat shares. Still, we must bare
in mind that the reformulation of an expression is not always insignificant
and indeed, this reformulation of ENP can shed the light on two possible
paths of interpretations. The first concerns the relation between ENP and
concentration indices and the second one concerns the statistical interpre-
tation of the ENP. Both kinds of interpretations explain why the ENP can
be expressed only as a function of n and the variance.
The ENP as number equivalent index
One of the reasons explaining the success story of the ENP can be found on
its intuitive meaning : “The effective number of components is the easiest
to visualize in concrete terms: [ENP]=2.28 directly tells us that there are
more than two but definitely less than three major parties [. . . ] One can
ask uninitiated students to estimate the effective number of parties and
they respond with values approximating [ENP]” (in Taagepera and Shugart
[1989], p.80).
The ENP is a number equivalent index. This type of index requires that if
all the parties in the party-system have the same number of seats, the value
taken by the index is the actual number of parties (see Adelman [1969]).
The difficulty in assessing the fragmentation of a party-system lies in the
variability among parties sizes. When all the parties have an equal number
of seats, there is no inequality in the distribution of seats, the actual number
of parties does convey some sense. If a number equivalent index evaluated
for a party-system achieves a value of k, we can say that the party-system
is as fragmented as if there were k parties of equal size. Of course a number
equivalent index does not always achieve integer values but this must not
create problems, first because it then tells us where the party-systems stands
according to situations with clearcut meaning (if the index is 1.5, you can
say that it is half fragmented than 3 or that it is just the halfway between 1
and 2 equal parties), secondly no one seems to be offended by an assertion
stating that last year, each american woman has given birth to one and half
children.
According to Blackorby et al. [1982], number equivalent indexes are in-
verse of concentration measures. Indeed, the link between the ENP and the
Hirschman-Herfindahl concentration index is well known (see Laakso and
Taagepera [1979] or Feld and Grofman [2007]). The ENP is simply the in-
verse of the Hirschman-Herfindahl (HH). Applied to a party-system, the HH
is calculated as HH(s) = 1/ENP(s) =
∑n
i=1 s
2
i . The HH index achieves (the-
4
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oretically) values between 0 and 1 indicating the degree of concentration. An
increase in the value of a number equivalent corresponds to a reduction in
the degree of concentration. A party-system highly concentrated (HH→ 1)
displays most probably a dominant party owning most of the available seats
and is thus poorly fragmented, with a low ENP close to 1 (the lower bound
for the ENP).
Concentration indices are not inequality indices, even though both are
related. Measures of concentration deal with the presence of dominant el-
ements in term of sizes in the distribution under study. Inequality indices
are concerned with the presence of small size elements by comparison of
large size elements in the distribution. To stress the distinction between the
aspects tackled by the measures, imagine a distribution with a giant size ele-
ment. If some tiny size elements enter into the distribution, a concentration
index won’t be affected whereas the inequality will greatly increase. The
variance of a distribution is not an adequate inequality index. If we double
each entry in a given distribution such that the mean is double and the
shape of the distribution remains unchanged, the variance would quadruple,
while common sense would difficultly accept that inequality is aggravated.
One way to transform the variance in an inequality index is to standardize
it, obtaining the coefficient of variation :
c(x) =
√
σ2(x)
µ(x)
or for s = xx¯ ,
c(s) = n
√
σ2(s),
a function of n and σ2(s). The coefficient of variation records the rel-
ative dispersion of distributions and is particularly adequate to compare
distributions with different means.
The precise link between concentration and inequality indices has been
demonstrated first in Davies [1979] and then by Blackorby et al. [1982].
They show that the inverse of a concentration measure (a number equivalent
index) can be written as a function of the number of elements n and a
measure of inequality (the coefficient of variation for example). Accordingly,
the ENP can be written as a function f(n, c(s)) where f is increasing in n
and decreasing in c(s). Let us rewrite equation 3 as
ENP(s) =
n
1 + c2(s)
=
n
1 +
(√
σ2(s)
µ(s)
)2 = n1 + n2σ2(s)
the desired relationship. Holding c(s) fixed, we see that ENP is increasing in
n and decreasing in c(s) for a fixed n. The ENP being a number equivalent
index, given the existing results in the literature, it is not a surprise that
the ENP can be expressed as a function of n and σ2.
5
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The ENP as statistic
In this section we present the second line of interpretation of the ENP in
term of statistic. We build on this interpretation on the story told by Feld
and Grofman [2007], the so-called “class-size paradox”2 , that we place in a
more general context. As Feld and Grofman [2007] state in footnote 3, p.103,
this paradox is a well-known phenomenon in the statistics literature, which
can be found under various names whose most frequent are “methods of
ascertainment” (Fischer [1934]), “length-biased sampling” (Cox and Lewis
[1966], Zelen [1972]), “the waiting time paradox” (Feller [1971], p.12),, “size-
biased sampling” (Scheaffer [1972]), “the inspection paradox” (Ross [1972]),
“weighted distributions” (Patil et al. [1988]), . . .
All these papers deal with the same problem of sampling bias. In the
class-size paradox, you want to estimate the average size of classes in a
school by asking students the size of their class. This method introduces an
estimation bias since you are sampling students and not classes. Suppose
that you repeatedly go for a walk after dinner and meet ten people in your
neighborhood out of which seven have a dog, you won’t surely conclude
that 70% of your neighbors have a dog. When you arrive randomly at a
bus stop, due to the variation of circulation of buses, you will have to wait
more than half the average time between two buses. You are more likely to
arrive during longer intervals between two buses and must wait on average
more than the average inter-arrival time. A radar fixed at an arbitrary
location on a highway has more chances to record faster cars, slow-developing
tumors have more chances to be detected in random medical screenings of a
population, . . . In all these examples, the variation in sizes or length matters
a lot, and the problem disappears as soon as there is no variation in size.
We have already seen that there is no difficulty to assess the fragmen-
tation in a party-system with equal size parties, but the raw number of
parties is a useless information as soon as there is variability in size. The
intuitive explanation usually put forward for the ENP is that some weight-
ing is necessary. Bigger parties receive more weight in the computation, and
to avoid arbitrary weights, we use weight proportional to size (Taagepera
[2007] p.58). This amounts to introducing a sampling bias. We now present
the ENP formula in the context of sampling bias to show the logic of its
weighting and to present the consequent interpretation.
We start with a finite party-system N with n parties. Let i = 1, . . . , n
denote the labels of parties in N . The distribution of seats among parties in
N is x = x1, . . . , xn with xi being the number of seats own by party i. We
design a random experiment consisting in drawing a party i. The discrete
random variable X is the number of seats own by party i. The probability
function associated to X is pX(xi) = P (X = xi). The expected value of X,
2(see also Feld [1991], Feld and Grofman [1977], Feld and Grofman [2010])
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denoted by E[X], is defined by
E[X] =
n∑
i=1
xip
X(xi).
This expression is the expected number of seats given the random selection
process of parties. Note that E[X] corresponds to the mean number of seats
µ in equation (1) if and only if pX(xi) =
1
n for all i ∈ N , when all parties
have the same probability to be selected. The variance of X, denoted by
Var(X) is defined by
Var(X) = E
[
(X − E[X])2] = n∑
i=1
pX(xi)(xi − E[X])2 = E[X2]− E2[X].
Again, the variance of X corresponds to the variance of the distribution σ2
in equation (2) if and only if pX(xi) =
1
n for all i ∈ N .
We now design another experiment that consists in drawing a seat s at
random, with s the label of the seat, taking values from 1 to x¯, the total
number of seats. To each seat corresponds one and only one party. The
discrete random variable X∗ is the number of seats of the corresponding
party owning s, i.e. if s belonging to party j has been chosen by the random
experiment, then X∗ = xj . The probability function associated to X∗ is
pX
∗
(xi) = P (X
∗ = xi). This experiment is an indirect way to choose a
party.3 Correspondingly, the expected value of X∗ is defined by
E[X∗] =
n∑
i=1
xip
X∗(xi).
and its variance by
E
[
(X∗ − E[X∗])2
]
=
n∑
i=1
pX
∗
(xi) (xi − E[X∗])2 = E[X∗2]− E2[X∗].
According to the random experiment chosen, there exist two different
ways to estimate the mean number of seats by party. In the second ex-
periment, selecting a seat is an indirect way of picking a party. Given the
number of seats owned by parties, parties are selected with a probability
proportional to the number of seats they have. The second experiment
is a method of sampling with bias proportional to size. X∗ is called the
size-biased version of X and the probability function of X∗ is called the
size-biased probability function of X
pX
∗
(X∗) =
XpX(X)
E[X]
3Note how our constructions mimic the procedure of computing the averages of class
size in Feld and Grofman [2007].
7
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and thus
E[X∗] =
n∑
i=1
xip
X∗(xi) =
∑n
i=1 x
2
i p
X(xi)
E[X]
=
Var(X) + E2[X]
E[X]
that can further be simplified
E[X] +
Var(X)
E[X]
= E[X∗]. (4)
The difference E[X∗] − E[X] = Var(X)E[X] is the bias involved estimating
E[X] by E[X∗].
Using this general setting, we are in state to give the interpretation of
the ENP in terms of the two random processes we have just designed.
We recall that the population of x¯ seats is distributed across n parties
and we denote xi the number of seats of party i, i = 1, . . . , n. Note that∑n
i=1 xi = x¯. Then the expected number of seats in a equally randomly
selected party , i.e. the average party size, is given by equation (1)
µ(x) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi =
x¯
n
with the corresponding variance σ2(x) (equation (2)). Now if x¯ = 1 we get
by equation (1)
µ(s) =
1
n
.
With the second random process consisting in drawing a seat at random,
we get the expected size (in number of seats) of a party containing an equally
randomly selected seat and it is given by
µ∗(x) =
n∑
i=1
xi
x¯
xi =
n∑
i=1
x2i
x¯
=
x21 + · · ·+ x2n
x1 + · · ·+ xn (5)
that comes from the reasoning of choosing a seat with probability 1x¯ and
recording the size of the party owning the seat, so that if you record the
score for all seats, out of x¯ seats, you will record xi times the size xi for each
possible i = 1, . . . , n. For each value xi in the first distribution, you get x
2
i
entries in the second distribution. If x¯ = 1 we get by equation (5)
µ∗(s) =
n∑
i=1
s2i =
1
ENP(x)
. (6)
Using equation (4) we have
µ∗(s) = µ(s) +
σ2(s)
µ(s)
= µ(s) + nσ2(s). (7)
8
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Combining equations (6) and (7), we get the identity in equation (3) of Feld
and Grofman [2007] (equation (10), p.105).
For example, suppose two parties with s1 = 0.6 and s2 = 0.4, draw a
seat at random and record the size of its party, with 60% of chances you will
record 0.6 and with 40% of chances you will record 0.4, making the expected
size of the party for the average seat 60%(0.6)+40%(0.4) = 0.52, contrasting
with the average size of parties of 0.6+0.42 = 0.5. The expected size from
drawing a party at random is 0.5 whereas the expected size of a party from
drawing at random a seat is 0.52. Both means can be obtained by direct
calculation using equations (1) and (5) or by equation (7) : µ∗(0.6, 0.4) =
0.5 + 0.010.5 = 0.52
In term of interpretation, µ(x) is the average size for a party, or the
size of the average party, whereas µ∗(x) is the size of the party owning the
average seat. Correspondingly, µ(s) are the seat shares of the average party
and µ∗(s) are the seat shares of the party owning the average seat. The
difference between µ(s) and µ∗(s) is the selection bias due to the method
of sampling. Here, we consider that the population elements are the seats
whereas the sampling or observational units are the parties, considered as
groups of seats. Hence, µ(s) is the group mean and µ∗(s) is the element
mean. By equation (7) we see that the element mean is always greater than
the group mean unless there is no variability (measured by σ2(s)) in the
distribution of seat shares. And this is exactly the rationale behind the
ENP : we want to attach more importance to bigger parties. If you select
a party indirectly by picking a seat, you have more chances to choose a
bigger party. The bigger the party, the more chances the seat chosen at
random belongs to the party. On the contrary, the probability that the
randomly chosen seat belongs to a smaller party is smaller. This process of
random group selection is known in the literature as selection of groups with
probability proportional to size (see Kish [1965]).
This leads to a new interpretation of the ENP. The inverse of the ENP
is the average size (in seat shares) of the party to which belongs a randomly
chosen seat denoted µ∗(s). Pick at random a seat, it will belong to a party
with 1/ENP seat shares. Generally speaking, an average is simply a total
number of units divided by the number of elements. Normalizing units in
seat shares, we get 1 as the total number of seat shares. The number of
elements in this line of interpretation is measured by an effective number of
parties. Hence we can call 1/ENP= µ∗(s) the effective average size in seat
shares.4 Again, if there is no variability in size among parties, the ENP is
the actual number of parties n, in that case, the effective average size µ∗(s)
is simply 1/n, the average size in seat shares µ(s). In a given assembly, we
4See Hannah and Kay [1977].
9
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tautologically always have
∑n
i=1 si = 1, then
1
ENP
= µ∗(s)⇔ ENP = 1
µ∗(s)
the effective number of parties is the total number of seat shares divided by
the effective average size.
Definition. Let x = x1, . . . , xn a distribution of seats among the n political
parties in a finite party-system N and x¯ =
∑n
i=1 xi the total number of seats
in N . The corresponding distribution of seat shares is denoted s = s1, . . . , sn
with si =
xi
x¯ for i =, 1 . . . , n.
• Draw a seat at random with probability 1x¯ and record the size of the
corresponding party, then µ∗(x) = x
2
1+···+x2n
x1+···+xn is the expected size of the
party owning the seat, or the effective average size.
• Correspondingly, µ∗(s) = s21+· · ·+s2n is the expected shares of the party
owning the seat, or the Hirschman-Herfindahl effective average
seat shares.
• With the same random process, the Laakso-Taagepera effective
number of parties ENP (x) = 1µ∗(s) is the expected number of
parties having the same size of the party owning the randomly selected
seat.
In light of this framework, the new interpretation of the ENP is quite
interesting. If you repeatedly draw a seat at random, then you know that
in average, there will be ENP(x) parties of the same size of the party from
which the chosen seat has been drawn, including this party. We also provide
a new interpretation of the classical concentration Hirschman-Herfindahl
index as the effective average size in seat shares, that contrasts with the
usual interpretation as the probability that two deputies picked at random
from among the parties will be of the same party (see Golosov [2010], Dalton
[2008]).5
The contraharmonic mean
In this section we briefly comment another occurrence of µ∗(x) = x
2
1+···+x2n
x1+···+xn
in the literature as contraharmonic mean or antiharmonic mean.
the first reason we can put forward in order to explain the given name
can be found for n = 2 (see Lann and Falk [2005]), where its relationship
5Draw a deputy at random, with probability 1/si he will belong to party i, draw another
deputy, with the same probability he will belong to party i, so that with probability 1/s2i
both will belong to the same party.
10
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with respect to the harmonic mean is plain. The arithmetic mean of two
numbers a and b is
A =
a+ b
2
.
The harmonic mean of two numbers a and b is
H =
2ab
a+ b
.
The contraharmonic mean of two numbers a and b is
C =
a2 + b2
a+ b
.
In these particular cases, C and H are equally distant from A, i.e.
C −A = A−H = (a− b)
2
2(a+ b)
.
Relationship that can be verified with C = 2A−H. The distance between C
and A being the same as the one between A and H but on the other way can
be considered as a good justification for the name contra or antiharmonic.
Alas, this relationship only holds for n = 2. Nevertheless, there still
exists a relationship between the contraharmonic and harmonic means. Let
X be a random variable and X∗ its size-biased version (see previous section
or appendix). Then it can be shown that (see Stein and Dattero [1985]) :
E
[
1
X∗
]
=
1
E[X]
.
Hence, in calculating the expectation of the inverse of the random vari-
ables X∗, i.e. the harmonic mean of X∗, we get the inverse of the expectation
of X. Hence, in order to estimate the expectation of X, it is sufficient to
take the inverse of the harmonic mean of X∗. This reason can constitute
another argument for the given name of contraharmonic.
Axiomatic characterization of the ENP
In this section, we present a set of independent postulates or axioms that,
if combined, fully characterize the ENP and its inverse, the HH. Note that
another axiomatization of the Hirschman-Herfindahl index already exists in
the literature (see Chakravarty and Eichorn [1991]) that completely differs
from ours.6 We adopt the usual notation : x ∈ Rn+ is the distribution of
6In Chakravarty and Eichorn [1991], the authors characterize a general class of concen-
tration indices, known as the Hannah-Kay class (see Hannah and Kay [1977]) to which the
Hirschman-Herfindahl index is a particular case. They show that among the self-weighted
quasi-linear means, the Hannah-Kay family is the only one to satisfy a replication axiom.
11
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seats among the n parties, for any n ∈ N. The corresponding shares is
denoted s ∈ [0, 1]n, si = xi/x¯ with x¯ =
∑n
i=1 xi. The Laakso-Taagepera
Effective Number of Parties is a function ENP :
⋃
n∈NRn+ → R+ such that
ENP(x) =
(
n∑
i=1
s2i
)−1
and the Hirschman-Herfindahl concentration index is a function HH :
⋃
n∈NRn+ →
R+ such that
HH(x) = 1/ENP(x) =
n∑
i=1
s2i .
We first provide the characterization of HH as measure of concentration.
Axiom 1 (Homogeneity of degree zero). For all n ∈ N, for all x ∈ Rn+, for
all scalars k > 0, a function C :
⋃
n∈NRn+ → R+ is homogeneous of degree
zero if and only if
C(x) = C(kx)
All what matters in the measurement of concentration are shares and
not absolute levels. An index of concentration is independent of the unit
in which the components of x are measured. In particular, measuring the
concentration on a given distribution or on the distribution expressed in
percentages should not change the degree of concentration, making concen-
tration a relative index. We can thus state the axiom in a weaker form :
Axiom 2 (Relative index). For all n ∈ N, for all x ∈ Rn+, C :
⋃
n∈NRn+ →
R+ is a relative index if and only if
C(x) = C
(x
x¯
)
.
Thus, if an index C is homogeneous of degree zero, C can be expressed
as a relative index.
Axiom 3 (Reflexivity). For all n ∈ N, for all a ∈ R+, a function C :⋃
n∈NRn+ → R+ is reflexive if and only if
C(1a) = 1/n
with 1 ∈ Rn+ = 1, . . . , 1.
That is, if the n quantities are equal, then the value taken by function
C as effective average size is simply 1/n. In particular, if there is only one
quantity in a distribution x ∈ R+ = {x}, then C(x) = 1.
Axiom 4 (Recursivity). For all n ∈ N, for all x ∈ Rn+, a function C :⋃
n∈NRn+ → R+ is recursive if and only if
C(x1, x2, x3, . . . , xn) = C(x1 + x2, x3, . . . , xn)− 2x1x2
x¯2
.
12
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This axiom belongs to the general class of recursivity properties
C(x1, x2, x3, . . . , xn) = C(x1 + x2, x3, . . . , xn) +G(x1, x2)
for functions C :
⋃
n∈NRn+ → R+ and G : R2+ → R+ where different gener-
ating functions G have been given in the literature in order to characterize
information measures such as entropy (see Ebanks et al. [1998], chap. 3
or Aczel and Daroczy [1975]). The motivation for this recursivity axiom is
to compare the concentration of two distributions with the same aggregate
quantities and one distribution has been obtained from the other by merg-
ing in one entry the first two entries of the original distribution. In that
case, by how much the concentration increases ? The difference in term of
concentration when x1 and x2 from a distribution x ∈ Rn+ merge in x1 + x2
in a distribution x′ ∈ Rn−1+ is given by
C(x′)− C(x) = G(x1, x2) = − 2
x¯2
x1x2
that can be rewritten
C(x′)− C(x)
x2
x¯
= −2x1
x¯
(8)
that is, the average concentration increase in term of the shares of x2 is a
linear function g(x1/x¯) = 2x1/x¯. Since we can write equation 8 as
C(x′)− C(x)
x1
x¯
= −2x2
x¯
we have
G(x1, x2) = g(x1/x¯)x2 = g(x2/x¯)x1 ⇒ g(x) = kx
with x ∈ R+ and k an arbitrary constant, in particular in this case k = −2/x¯.
The interpretation of the recursivity is now plain : the average increase of
concentration resulting from a merging of two entries is linear, the simplest
form of increase we can find.
Theorem 1. For all n ∈ N, for all x ∈ Rn+, a function C :
⋃
n∈NRn+ → R+
satisfies axioms 2-4 if and only if C(x) = HH(x).
Proof. (⇒)
Note that we can rewrite
HH(x) =
∑n
i=1(xi)
2
(
∑n
i=1 xi)
2
to see directly that
HH(kx) =
∑n
i=1(kxi)
2
(
∑n
i=1 kxi)
2 =
k2
∑n
i=1 x
2
i
k2 (
∑n
i=1 xi)
2 =
∑n
i=1 x
2
i
(
∑n
i=1 xi)
2
13
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for any scalar k > 0, so that HH satisfies axiom 1, and thus axiom 2. Let
x = 1a with a ∈ R+. Then we have
HH(x) =
∑n
i=1 a
2
(
∑n
i=1 a)
2 =
na2
n2a2
=
1
n
,
satisfying the axiom 3.
Now, for any x ∈ Rn+,
HH(x) =
n∑
i=1
s2i = s
2
1 + s
2
2 + s
2
3 + · · ·+ s2n = (s1 + s2)2 + s23 + · · ·+ s2n− 2s1s2,
satisfying the axiom 4.
(⇐)
For any x ∈ Rn+, by axiom 2,
C(x) = C(s).
By axioms 3, for x ∈ R+,
C(x) = 1.
Let Si =
∑i
j=1 sj and S˙i = Si−1si for all i = 1, . . . , n− 1.
By successive applications of axiom 4,
C(s1, . . . , sn) = C(s1 + s2, s3, . . . , sn)− 2s1s2
= C(S2, s3, . . . , sn)− 2S˙2
= C(S2 + s3, s4, . . . , sn)− 2S˙2 − 2S2s3
= C(S3, s4, . . . , sn)− 2S˙2 − 2S˙3
...
= C(Sn−1, sn)− 2
(
n−1∑
i=2
S˙i
)
= C(Sn−1, 1− Sn−1)− 2
(
n−1∑
i=2
S˙i
)
= C(Sn−1 + 1− Sn−1)− 2
(
n∑
i=2
S˙i
)
= 1− 2
(
n∑
i=2
S˙i
)
=
n∑
i=1
s2i = HH(x)
14
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by noting that sn = 1−
∑n−1
i=1 si = 1− Sn−1.
The axiomatization of the ENP can be done straightforward by some
simple adaptation of the axioms, since the ENP can be expressed as the
inverse of HH.
Axiom 5 (Reflexivity*). For all n ∈ N, for all a ∈ R+, a function C :⋃
n∈NRn+ → R+ is reflexive if and only if
C(1a) = n
with 1 ∈ Rn+ = 1, . . . , 1.
Axiom 6 (Recursivity*). For all n ∈ N, for all x ∈ Rn+, a function C :⋃
n∈NRn+ → R+ is recursive if and only if
C(x1, x2, x3, . . . , xn) = C(x1 + x2, x3, . . . , xn)− 2x¯
2
x1x2
.
Theorem 2. For all n ∈ N, for all x ∈ Rn+, a function C :
⋃
n∈NRn+ → R+
satisfies axioms 2,5 and 6 if and only if C(x) = ENP(x).
Other desirable properties have been proposed in the literature for the
effective number of parties or HH, but they appear to be logically deducible
from the conjunction of the ones elevated to the rank of axioms. One of them
is zero shares independence : if a party has zero shares in a party-system,
it should not influence the fragmentation/concentration.
Definition (Zero shares independence). For all n ∈ N, for all x ∈ Rn+ a
function C : Rn+ → R+ is independent of zero entries in x, if and only if
C(x, 0) = C(x).
This property can be deduced from homogeneity and recursivity :
C(x1, x2, x3, . . . , xn, 0) = C(x1 + x2, x3, . . . , xn, 0)− 2x1x2
x¯2
= C(x1 + x2 + x3, . . . , xn, 0)− 2x1x2 − (x1 + x2)x3
x¯2
= . . .
= 1− 2
(
n∑
i=2
S˙i
)
− 2
(
n∑
i=1
xi
)
0
=
n∑
i=1
s2i = C(x1, x2, x3, . . . , xn).
Another desirable property also states that merging of two entries should
not reduce concentration. This can also been to be satisfied thanks to the
15
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recursivity axiom. To deepen our intuitive understanding of the functioning
and interpretation of the recursivity axiom, we present the next corollary of
Theorem 1.
Corrollary 1. For all n ∈ N, for all x ∈ Rn+ such that x1 = x¯2 , let C :⋃
n∈NRn+ → R+ be a concentration index satisfying axioms 2,5 and 6, then
C(x1 + x2, x3, . . . , xn)− C(x1, x2, x3, . . . , xn) = s2
that is the increase in concentration resulting from the merging of x1 and x2
is exactly s2 =
x2
x¯ .
Let s ∈ [0, 1]n be a seat shares distribution such that s1 = 50%, then,
by the recursivity axiom we know that HH(0.5 + s2, s3, . . . , sn) − HH(s) =
s2. In particular, if s = (0.5, 0.5), by the reflexivity axiom HH(s) = 1/2.
By the reflexivity axiom we also have HH(s1 + s2 = 1) = 1, and thus
HH(1)−HH(s) = 1/2, as desired.
Conclusion
Various authors have proposed amelioration of the Laakso-Taagepera effec-
tive number of parties in order to measure the fragmentation without taking
the time to address the fundamental question of defining what is the frag-
mentation of a party-system? Since the measurement of fragmentation is
now intimately linked to the ENP, even exclusively, we propose a statistical
interpretation of the ENP as consistent definition of party-system fragmenta-
tion. By putting the class-size paradox of Feld and Grofman [2007] in a more
general statistical framework, we can tell a nice story in which fits perfectly
the measurement of fragmentation and draw thereby a new interpretation
by analogy. This new interpretation is the following. For a given party-
system, the ENP is in expectation, the number of parties having the same
size as the party owning a seat drawn at random with probability equals
to 1 over the total number of seats. The inverse of the ENP, known as the
Hirschman-Herfindahl concentration index, is the expected size of the party
owning a seat drawn at random with the same probability. We then show
how the ENP is fully characterized by the properties of zero-homogeneity,
reflexivity and a particular recursion equation.
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Appendix
In this appendix, we reproduce some entries that can be found in Patil et al.
[1988]. Suppose X is a nonnegative observable random variable with PDF
f(x). Suppose a realization x of X under f (x) enters the investigator’s
record with probability proportional to w(x, β), so that Pr(Recording|X =
x) = w(x, β).
Here the recording (weight) function w(x, β) is a nonnegative function
with parameter β representing the recording (sighting) mechanism. Clearly,
the recorded x is not an observation on X, but on the random variable Xw
having PDF
fw(x, β) =
w(x, β)f(x)
ω
(9)
where ω = E[w(X,β)] is the normalizing factor, making the total proba-
bility equal to unity. The random variable Xw is called the weighted version
of X, and its distribution in relation to that of X is called the weighted dis-
tribution with weight function w. An important weighted distribution cor-
responds to w(x, β) = x, in which case, Xw = X∗ is called the size-biased
version of X . The distribution of X∗ is called the size-biased distribution
of PDF
f∗(x) =
xf(x)
µ
(10)
where µ = E[X]. The PDF f∗ is called the length-biased or size-biased ver-
sion of f , and the corresponding observational mechanism is called length-
or size-biased sampling.
Some interesting results concerning size-biased sampling : (Zelen [1972]).
The expected value of the size- biased version X∗ is E[X∗] = µ[1 + σ2/µ2],
where E[X] = µ and V (X) = σ2. Furthermore, the harmonic mean of
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X∗ is equal to the mean of the original random variable X when it is pos-
itive, i.e., E[1/X∗] = 1/µ. Another way of expressing these results is that
E[X∗]E[1/X∗] = 1 + σ2/µ2.
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